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Forum Non Conveniens and Multinational
Corporations: A Government Interest Approach
Hazardous manufacturing facilities in the United States are subject to stringent government regulation as well as increasingly costly
tort liability. One response to these burdens is the relocation of the
most heavily regulated facilities to countries whose laws are more
favorable towards manufacturers. Differences in law normally reflect
differences in government policy. Properly functioning conflict of
laws rules determine when the policies reflected in the laws of the
forum are sufficiently important to override those of other interested
governments. Thus, conflicts rules should determine when the laws
of the United States should govern claims properly brought in U.S.
courts for injuries sustained in foreign countries.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a district court to
dismiss a case when a defendant can show that the forum chosen by
plaintiff is so inconvenient as to be inappropriate. When a U.S.based multinational corporation is sued in the United States, the
present practice of refusing adjudication in extraterritorial tort cases
based on forum non conveniens ignores the real issues of substantive liability. Because the doctrine operates more often as a Draconian choice of law device,I rather than as an instrument of justice
and convenience, 2 courts should consider the interest of the United
States in applying its law in addition to the "private" and "public"
convenience factors3 that now determine the "appropriateness" of
the domestic forum. This could be achieved by a preliminary conflict
of laws analysis allowing the court to determine whether either government has a paramount interest in seeing its law applied. 4 Such an
I The actual determination of applicable law is governed by the conflicts rules of the
alternative forum. Normally, where foreign plaintiffs bring claims in U.S. courts against
U.S. corporations for injuries suffered abroad they do so because they believe that those
courts will apply more favorable law. See, e.g., infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). The preliminary results
of one study show that foreign plaintiffs whose cases are dismissed on the basis of forum
non conveniens in the United States normally abandon the claim or settle for a fraction of
its value. Robertson, Introduction to the Bhopal Symposium, 20 TEX. INT'L LJ. 269, 271-72
n. 1l (1985).
2 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
3 These factors were set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). For
a discussion, see infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.

700

N.CJ.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 1 1

interest might weigh heavily in the evaluation of a subsequent motion for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens.
When the application of foreign law would allow U.S.-based
multinational corporations to defeat the purposes of a congressional
regulatory scheme, the United States has a compelling governmental
interest in compensating victims of extraterritorial toxic torts committed by those corporations. Absent some equally compelling interest of another government, this should be sufficient justification
for a court to implement the applicable state law5 rather than the law
of the place of injury. The applicability of U.S. law, in turn, weighs
6
heavily against a dismissal for forum non conveniens.
This comment addresses the common law liability of privately
owned, U.S.-based corporations. It assumes sufficient contacts for
the assertion of personal jurisdiction, diversity 7 or some other statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction,8 and sufficient control by
the U.S. parent corporation of any subsidiary incorporated under the
laws of a foreign country to justify suit directly against that parent. 9
Questions of state responsibility,' 0 and the possible application of
5 In diversity cases this will be the law of the state where the suit is brought. See infra
note 73.
6 See Ali v. Offshore Co., 753 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1980). See also infra note 75
and accompanying text.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
8 Although it is rarely used, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) provides for jurisdiction over
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
....
Filartiga
. v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), remanded, 577 F. Supp. 860
(E.D.N.Y. 1984)(awarding $10,000,000 for tortious violation of the international law prohibition on torture). The presence of federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)) is excellent evidence of a governmental interest in keeping the case within the
federal court system and would weigh heavily against dismissal on the ground of forum
non conveniens.
9 For purposes of this comment, a U.S.-based multinational corporation shall be defined as a unified enterprise consisting of a "parent," chartered in the United States, which
holds a majority interest in, or otherwise controls, one or more "subsidiaries" chartered
under the laws of a foreign country. If such subsidiary, in turn, controls other corporations, they will also be part of the unified enterprise. Local incorporation is often required
as a prerequisite to transacting business in the host country. See W. FREIDMAN &J. BEGUIN,
JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1-9 (1971); JOINT
COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. OF THE A.L.I. AND THE A.B.A., A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS? 187 (1963 & Supp. 1977). More importantly for

tort purposes, local incorporation provides to the parent corporation at least formal protection from the debts of its subsidiary. Thus, before a multinational can be held liable in
most cases, some vehicle must be found to override the protections of corporate structure.
For a discussion of current theories for reaching the assets of parent corporations, see
Aronofsky, Piercingthe TransnationalCorporate Veil: Trends, Developments, and the Need for WidespreadAdoption of EnterpriseAnalysis, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 31, 44, 49 (1985). An
extension of the enterprise theory of liability would provide such a vehicle without violating the policies underlying limited corporate liability. At least one court has extended the
enterprise theory to hold a parent corporation liable in tort despite a law of the host country which required 60% local ownership. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d
711, 723, 101 Cal. Rptr..314, 322 (1972).
10 See Handl, State Liabilityfor Accidental TransnationalEnvironmental Damage By Private
Persons, 74 AM.J. INT'L L. 525 (1980).
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treaty provisions"I are not discussed.

The doctrine of forum non conveniens is ajudicially created rule
of venue' 2 that allows a trial judge to decline adjudication of a claim
upon a showing by defendant that a more appropriate alternative forum exists. The doctrine appears to have originated in Scotland i s
and has entered the common law of several states' 4 and of admiralty. 15 The current method of applying forum non conveniens to
cases falling within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts was
articulated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.'6 The
Court held that a federal district court in a diversity action has the
power to decline adjudication of an otherwise valid claim upon determining that plaintiff's choice of forum is unnecessarily burdensome to defendant. 17 To guide the district courts in evaluating
motions for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens, the

Court enumerated private and public interest factors weighing in
favor of dismissal.
The private factors set out by the Gilbert Court' 8 are essentially
logistical. Consideration of the relative cost of transportation, avail11 See Note, Compensating Private Partiesfor TransnationalPollution Injury, 58 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 528 (1984).
12 In Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 347
(1985), the court held that forum non conveniens is a procedural rule arising from the
court's general powers under article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1218-19. See infra
note 28 and accompanying text.
13 Apparently, the doctrine applies in all states except Florida. Sibaja, 757 F.2d at
1217 n.3. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908, 909-11
(1947), cited with approval in Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981).
14 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 n.4 (1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum
non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
15 Canada Malting Co. v. Patterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932); Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL
L.Q. 12 (1949).
16 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
17 "Gilbert held that dismissal may be warranted where a plaintiff chooses a particular
forum, not because it is convenient, but solely in order to harass the defendant or take
advantage of favorable law." Piper, 454 U.S. at 249 n.15 (1981).
In Gilbert plaintiff sued in the Southern District of New York for the destruction of his
warehouse in Virginia alleging negligent handling of gasoline. The Second Circuit held
that the district court lacked the power to decline adjudication of a claim properly within
the applicable jurisdiction and venue statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
a trial judge has broad discretion to dismiss claims when the balance of private and public
convenience factors shows another forum to be more appropriate. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 501.
18 The Court stated the private factors as follows:
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory
process for obtaining the attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
the attendance of willing witnesses; the possibility of view of the premises, if
view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive ... [including the]
enforceability of a judgement .... [Pilaintiff may not by the choice of an
inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant .... Unless

the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
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ability of witnesses, access to evidence and availability of compulsory
process may reveal that another forum is far more convenient to the
defendant. If plaintiff cannot justify this burden, the court may dismiss the suit for undue oppression and vexation of defendant.
Some of these factors have been questioned by lower courts in
light of the changed circumstances of modern life. Several judges of
the Second Circuit have favored consideration of the "increased
speed and ease of travel and communication which make ... no fo-

rum 'as inconvenient [today] as it was in 1947.' "19 The relative ability of the parties to meet the costs of trial in a distant forum has also
20
been considered.
The Gilbert Court listed three public interest factors: 2 1 1) avoiding congestion in those courts most attractive to plaintiffs; 2) the relative interests of the alternative communities in providing jurors in
the viewing the trial; and 3) the inconvenience to the court of applying unfamiliar law. The appropriateness of holding trial in a forum
"that is at home with the state law that must govern the case" 22 was
emphasized in Gilbert as an alternative to having a court "untangle
problems in Conflict of Laws."

23

While there may have been more

certainty as to which state laws would apply in 1947 than there is
today, 24 it is difficult to comprehend how a trial judge would know
which state law must govern a case without untangling problems in
conflict of laws.2 5 Consideration of the interests of the concerned

19 Manu Int'l, S.A. v. Avon Prod., Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes,J. dissenting), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1052 (1976)). In Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. Cargolux Airlines, Int'l, S.A.,
712 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (Oakes, J. dissenting), Judge Oakes contended that: "the
entire doctrine of forum non conveniens should be reexamined in light of the transportation revolution that has occurred in the last thirty-six years ...." [citations omitted];
Calavo Growers of Cal. v. Generali Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J.
concurring), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981).
20 The cost to a wealthy corporation of bringing witnesses and documents to the forum was assigned little weight in D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 398 F. Supp. 72, 84 (D.
Del. 1975). See also Reavis v. Gulf Oil Corp., 85 F.R.D. 666, 671, 673 (D. Del. 1980).
21 The public interest factors were stated as follows:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden
that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no
relation to the litigation. In cases which touch upon the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than
in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only.
There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.
There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather
than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of
laws, and in law foreign to itself.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
22 Id.
23 Id.

24 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
25 In cases where there is no true conflict, there would also be no difficulty in applying choice of law.
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communities in implementing the policies behind conflicting laws is
conspicuously absent from the enumeration of public interest factors
in Gilbert.
The progeny of Gilbert are many. Although forum non conveniens has been superseded by statute in the domestic context, 26 it
is used as a vehicle to dismiss extraterritorial tort claims where the
combined inconvenience to the defendant and to the
court outweigh
27
the interest of the plaintiff in his choice of forum.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is not mandated by any
limit on judicial competence; rather it "derives from the court's inherent power under article III of the Constitution, to control the administration of the litigation before it and to prevent its process from
becoming an instrument of abuse, injustice and oppression."' 28 In
diversity cases, the doctrine is a matter of federal common law 29 and
operates only when the case is properly before the court. 30 The bur3
den of proof in the Gilbert analysis will always be on the defendant. '
Before a trial court commences a Gilbert analysis, the defendant
must make a preliminary showing that an adequate alternative forum
exists.32 If no alternative forum exists, forum non conveniens is in26 See Piper, 454 U.S. at 253-54. Congress responded to Gilbert by passing a liberal
transfer of venue statute in 1948. Judiciary Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 87 § 1404, 62 Stat.
889, 937 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982)). The statute, however, applies
only within the federal system. The doctrine appears to flourish in the state courts. See E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 372-82 (1982).
Gilbert continues to be the leading case enumerating the factors a trial judge must
consider in evaluating a motion for dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens in
international cases. See, e.g., Piper, 454 U.S. at 261; Maria Victoria Naviera, S.A. v. Cementes del Valle, S.A., 759 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1985).
27 A strong presumption operates in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum. Gilbert,
330 U.S. at 508.
28 Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
347 (1985).
29 In Sibaja, the court did not directly rule on the question of whether forum non
conveniens is properly governed by federal or state law when raised in a federal court
sitting in diversity, but it did hold that forum non conveniens is a procedural rule arising
from the court's general powers under article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1219.
Where the state rule conflicts with the federal rule, the federal rule applies. Id.
Although both Gilbert and Piper were diversity actions, the Supreme Court found that
the applicable state rules were identical to the federal rule and therefore declined to pass
upon the Erie question. Piper, 454 U.S. at 248 n.13 (Pennsylvania law). Gilbert, 330 U.S. at
509 (New York law). The application of the doctrine in state courts is beyond the scope of
this comment. See E. SCOLES, supra note 26, at 372-82.
30 "[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is an absence of
jurisdiction or mistake of venue." Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 504.
31 "The burden is on the defendant to establish that the action should be dismissed."
Maria Victori, 759 F.2d at 1027. See also Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1160 (2d
Cir. 1978).
32 "At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine
whether there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied
when the defendant is 'amenable to process' in the other jurisdiction." Piper, 454 U.S. at
254 n.22.
The distinction between the adequacy of the alternate forum and the adequacy of the
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applicable.3 3 The alternative forum, however, need not recognize
the same rules of law and procedure. The doctrine is applicable despite a lower maximum limit on recovery3 4 and the existence of a
35
substantial filing fee in the alternate forum.
Courts have found alternate forums inadequate where defendants were unable to prove that the judiciary was independent of the
ruling junta,3 6 plaintiff reasonably feared that he would be shot if he
returned to the alternative forum,3 7 and the statute of limitations
had run in the alternative forum.3 8 The ability of plaintiff to sustain
the cost of litigating in an alternate forum is also important to the
analysis. Thus, the unavailability of attorneys on a contingent fee
basis in the alternate forum has been held to tip the balance of private factors.3 9 In Manu International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc. 40 the
likelihood that trial in the alternate forum would be neither fair nor
expeditious was sufficient to justify the Second Circuit in reversing
41
the district court.
The adequacy of a remedy available in an alternative forum is a
major part of the adequacy of the forum itself,42 and would be a central issue in a preliminary determination of the applicable law. A foreign remedy would thus be inadequate if its application would be
detrimental to the interest of the United States in implementing a
congressional regulatory program unless such interest were counterbalanced by a more pressing interest of the alternate forum.
The Gilbert analysis leaves the balancing of the relevant factors to
the trial judge. The Court intentionally refused to create an inflexible hierarchy among the relevant factors which would unduly limit a
remedies available in that forum is unclear. The distinction is largely academic as a forum
that provides an inadequate remedy will itself be inadequate. Id.
33 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. See also Vaz Borralho v. Keydril Co., 696 F.2d 379, 393
(5th Cir. 1983); Manu Int'l, 641 F.2d at 67; Phoenix Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D.
445, 452-53 (D. Del. 1978).
34 Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 160-64 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
35 Cheng v. Boeing, 708 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cho-Pon v.
Boeing Co., 464 U.S. 1017 (1983).
36 Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, S.A., 528 F.
Supp. 1337, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984).

37 Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), afd, 767
F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985).
38 In re Air Crash Disaster near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. 1175, 1181 (W.D. Wash.
1982).
9 Odita v. Elder Dempster Lines, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 547, 550-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Contingency fees are not permitted in most legal systems. See Weinberg, Insights and Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 307, 317 n.59 (1985) (arguing in favor of
considering the unavailability of contingency fees).
40 641 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1981).
41 Id. at 67. "It is almost a perversion of theforum non conveniens doctrine to remit a
plaintiff, in the name of expediency, to a forum in which, realistically, it will be unable to
bring suit." Id.
42 See Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
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trial judge in weighing the myriad factual considerations bearing on
has been refined, the courts have emeach case. 43 As the doctrine
44
phasized various factors.
One important factor in assessing the weight a trial judge should
accord to plaintiff's choice of forum is the citizenship of the parties. 4 5 Considerations of convenience to defendant are particularly
46
inappropriate when the defendant is a citizen of the chosen forum.
Additionally, where a claim is one of many against a single defendant
arising under similar circumstances (e.g., products liability suits for a
harmful drug or claims arising from a single air disaster), the ease of
47
access to sources of proof favors trial of all claims in a single court.
This may, however, be outweighed by countervailing considerations. 4 8 The fact that defendant does business in the contested forum also mitigates in favor of retaining the case. 4 9 Typically, claims
that defendant or his witnesses will not be amenable to the jurisdiction or process of the alternate forum are resolved by conditioning
dismissal on defendant's agreement to submit to the process, jurisdiction, and judgment of the alternate forum. 50 The possibility of an
unfavorable change in law 5 ' is also not dispositive in a forum non
43 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. See also Piper, 454 U.S. at 249.
44 Judge Wilkey, of the District of Columbia Circuit, condensed the Gilbert analysis
into a four step process:
[A] district judge's forum non conveniens inquiry should proceed in four steps.
As a prerequisite, the court must establish whether an adequate alternative
forum exists which possesses jurisdiction over the whole case. Next, the trial
judge must consider all relevant factors of private interest, weighing in the
balance a strong presumption against disturbing plaintiffs initial forum
choice. If the trial judge finds this balance of private interests to be equipose
or near equipose, he must then determine whether or not factors of public
interest tip the balance in favor of a trial in a foreign forum. If he decides
that the balance favors such a forum, the trial judge must finally ensure the
plaintiffs can reinstate their suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.
Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1128 (1981). Pain was cited with approval in Piper, 454 U.S. at 256-57 nn.23-24. Its
analysis has also been followed in the D.C. Circuit. See Friends for all Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 717 F.2d 602, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
45 A foreign plaintiff is accorded less deference in his choice of forum. Piper, 454 U.S.
at 255 n.23. U.S. citizenship does not, however, guarantee access to the federal courts.
Cheng, 708 F.2d at 1411.
46 When defendant is resident in a forum, this "weighs heavily against dismissal."
Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1164 (2d Cir.. 1978). See alsoAlcoa S.S. Co., 654 F.2d
at 147. Manu Int'l, 641 F.2d at 67; Pain, 637 F.2d at 797; Note, Forum Non Conveniens and
Foreign Plaintifs in the Federal Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1267 (1981).
47 Friendsfor all Children, 717 F.2d at 608-09.
48 Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 1984).
49 Friendsfor all Children, 717 F.2d at 609.
50 See, e.g., Dowling, 727 F.2d at 611. Failure to show that defendants are amenable to
foreign process (by consent or otherwise) will defeat a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens. Watson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 769 F.2d 354, 357 (6th Cir.
1985).
51 This was the specific question which prompted the Piper Court to grant certiorari.
Id. at 261-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The principle has been faithfully applied in the
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conveniens determination.
Judge Wilkey accurately stated the essence of the modern public
interest analysis in his frequently quoted 52 opinion in Pain v. United
Technologies Corp.5 3 "[T]he central question which a court must answer when weighing the public interest factors in the outcome... of a
case... is whether the case has a general nexus with the forum sufficient to justify5 4 the forum's committment of judicial time and resources to it."

The doctrine of forum non conveniens was expanded by the
Supreme Court as a result of the Third Circuit decision in Reyno v.
Piper Aircraft Corp.5 5 The court in Reyno held that a district court
should consider the adverse effect on plaintiffs of an unfavorable
change in substantive law before granting a motion to dismiss on the
basis of forum non conveniens. 5 6 The Third Circuit found that the
trial judge had misapplied the applicable conflict of laws rules when
he considered the necessity of applying foreign law as one of the
Gilbert public interest factors weighing in favor of dismissal. 57 The
court further held that the balance of factors did not justify
58
dismissal.
In PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno 59 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the
forum non conveniens inquiry."'60 In rejecting the notion that forum
non conveniens should be governed by the relative advantages to the
plaintiff of the substantive law in his chosen jurisdiction, the Court
6
reasoned that such a test would not only emasculate the doctrine '
and entangle the hectic trial courts in "complex exercises in comparative law," '6 2 but would also encourage forum shopping and "further
63
congest already crowded courts."
lower courts. See, e.g., Alcoa S.S. Co., 654 F.2d at 159 (alternate forum had a $570,000 limit
on an $8,000,000 claim).
52 See, e.g., Piper, 454 U.S. at 250.
53 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
54 Id. at 791.

55 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981).
56 Reyno, 630 F.2d at 163-64. The district court determined that trial of the case in
Scotland would deprive the plaintiffs of a strict liability theory of recovery. Reyno v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 479 F. Supp. 727, 736 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
57 The district court had found Scottish law applicable to one defendant; the court of
appeals found that Ohio law would apply. Reyno, 630 F.2d at 171.
58 Id.

59 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
60 Id. at 247.

61 The Court pointed out that plaintiffs will rarely choose to bring a claim in a forum
which would apply substantive laws less favorable than the law of the place of the tort. Id.
at 250.
62 Id. at 251.
63 Id. at 252. The Court also rejected the Third Circuit's analogy to Van Deusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). There, the Court had determined that the transfer under 28
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The Court in Piper did not hold that a forum has no interest in
seeing its law applied in appropriate cases. 6 4 Rather, the Court concluded that a foreign plaintiff's interest in taking advantage of generous tort rules is insufficient to justify burdening the defendant with

an inconvenient forum and the court with "complex exercises in
comparative law." ' 65 The Court left open the possibility that governmental interests in seeing forum law applied might, in appropriate
66
cases, weigh in plaintiff's favor.
The second major thrust of the Supreme Court opinion in Piper
is that the trial judge should have broad discretion in applying the
Gilbert analysis. While conceding that the district court's characteri' 67
zation of the private interest factors was "somewhat exaggerated,
and that the district court may have erroneously included the need to
apply foreign law among the public interest factors weighing in favor
of dismissal, the Court found that the Third Circuit had erred in rejecting the Gilbert analysis as applied by the district court. 68 In its
reasoning, the Court stated that decisions to grant or deny motions
for dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens are "committed to the second discretion of the trial court. [They] may be re'6 9
versed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion."
U.S.C. § 1404 should not result in an unfavorable change in substantive law. Piper, 454
U.S. at 253.
64 Indeed, "a limitation upon or denial of recovery is in and of itself a ground for not
dismissing on the basis of forum non coveniens." Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. Cargolux
Airlines, Int'l, S.A., 712 F.2d 11, 14 (1983) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 251.

66 "The American interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment ofjudicial time and resources that would inevitably be required if the
case were to be tried here." Id. at 260-61.
Senior Judge Friendly criticized the Supreme Court's reading of the appellate decision for giving too much weight to a single passage. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion,
31 EMORY L.J. 747, 748-54 (1982). The Court stated that the Third Circuit had "decided
that dismissal is automatically barred if it would lead to a change in the applicable law
unfavorable to the plaintiff." Piper, 454 U.S. at 246. The opinion gave only cursory treatment to the appellate court's detailed conflict of laws analysis, stating simply that "[elven if
the Court of Appeals' conclusion [that United States law would apply to both defendants]
is correct, however, all other public interest factors favored trial in Scotland." Id. at 260.
Judge Friendly points out that "most readers would not have thought that the [appellate]
court had laid down such an absolute rule if the Supreme Court had not said it had."
Friendly, supra note 66, at 749 n.4. For one commentator's view of the appellate decision
before it was reversed, see Note, supra note 46, at 1273-75.
67 Piper, 454 U.S. at 257.

68 Id. at 261. Only four justices endorsed this section of the opinion. For an eloquent criticism of the Supreme Court's mandate of deference to the district court's application of forum non conveniens, see Friendly, supra note 66, at 751-56. The deference
accorded trial judges in their forum non conveniens determinations has been criticized for
seemingly inconsistent outcomes. Compare Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d
608 (6th Cir. 1984) and Haddad v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (opposite holdings on virtually identical fact patterns). See also Kennelly, Choice
of Laws, Jurisdiction and Forum non Conveniens, 1982 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 260, 292-93.
69 Piper, 454 U.S. at 257. Abuse of discretion has been found where the trial court
failed to consider such factors as the unavailability of contingent fees and the existence of
substantial filing fees. See DeShane v. Deere & Co., 726 F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 1984)
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When a district court grants a motion for dismissal on the basis
of forum non conveniens the order is clearly appealable as a final
disposition of the case. 70 Denial of the motion is not reviewable as a
collateral order. 7 ' Thus, as review of the motion after the case has
proceeded to trial on the merits would clearly defeat the interests of
convenience served by the doctrine, the denial of dismissal is effec72
tively unreviewable.
Quite apart from the inadequacy of the present test for determining convenience, forum non conveniens is not the proper vehicle
for determining whether a victim injured by the hazardous manufacturing activities of a U.S. corporation should be compensated according to U.S. law or left to often questionable prospects for
compensation under the legal system of the host country. 73 Forum
non conveniens does not address the policies favoring application of
substantive principles, nor does it address the interests of the legal
systems involved in seeing their policies implemented. In applying
forum non conveniens to the claims of foreign plaintiffs arising from
the extraterritorial toxic torts of U.S.-based multinational corporations, 74 federal courts should focus more on the policies behind substantive rules of law than on the convenience to a corporation of
maintaining suit in its home forum.
In practice, although some U.S. defendants may genuinely find
it more convenient to litigate in the alternate forum, 75 the real issue
is rarely the physical convenience of the forum. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Piper,76 defendants raising motions for dismissal
on the ground of forum non conveniens are often "engaged in reverse forum shopping. ' '7 7 Plaintiffs will normally select the forum
(dismissal for forum non conveniens), on remand aff'd, 747 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1984);
Macedo v. Boeing Co., 693 F.2d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 1982).
70 Sigalas v. Lido Maritime, Inc., 776 F.2d 1512, 1516 (1lth Cir. 1985).
71 In Nallis v. Rolls Royce, 702 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 (1983),
the D.C. Circuit denied a hearing en banc on the issue of forum non conveniens despite
arguments that a denial of dismissal is a collateral order. Id. at 259-60. Clearly, the policies of avoiding inconvenience to the defendants and the court which underlie forum non
conveniens would not be served by review after final judgment on the merits.

72 Nallis, 702 F.2d at 259-60.
73 See Robertson, supra note 1. In cases where dismissal on the ground of forum non
conveniens is denied, the court must undertake a conflicts analysis to determine which law

is applicable. See supra note 87. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the conflicts
rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); cf
E. SCOLES, supra note 26, at 110-13 (arguing for a federal common law rule of conflict of
laws).
74 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 269; Note, The Razors Edge: The Doctrine of Forum non
Conveniens and the Union Carbide Methyl Isocyanate Gas Disasterat Bhopal, India, 10 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 743 (1985); Note, jurisdiction and Conflicts of Law-The Bhopal Litigation, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 637 (1985).

75 See, e.g., Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 503.
7c 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
77 Id. at 252 n.19. The Court clearly stated that both:
[T]he possibility of a change in law unfavorable to the plaintiff... [and] ...
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where they have the greatest chance for a large recovery. 78 Defendants will oppose the choice either because the forum is truly less convenient than a foreign forum or because the alternative forum is
likely to apply substantive law more favorable to the defendant.
If the forum non conveniens analysis were preceded by a determination of the law applicable in the federal court, the court would
be able to address the real concerns of the parties. Rather than simply dismissing the case whenever the defendant is able to show inconvenience, the court could determine whether the United States
has a significant interest in the application of its laws. 79 If there were

a significant U.S. interest, this could be weighed against the interest
of the alternate forum in having its law applied.
Conflicts of laws is, thus, the arena in which competing governmental policies should vie. Current conflict and choice of law rules
in the United States are anything but uniform. Nonetheless, most
state rules now recognize that determination of the applicable law
requires some inquiry into the policies which governments seek to
implement through conflicting laws. 8 0 Only through some balancing
between the competing interests of governments in implementing
the policies behind their laws can the courts arrive at a rational determination of liability.
The United States has an interest in discouraging those indus-

tries that are heavily regulated in this country from seeking regulation-free havens in other countries. A further interest of the United
States is carrying out the objectives of the regulatory schemes governing hazardous manufacturing activities. Courts could weigh these
interests against the interests and policies behind the substantive law

applicable in other countries through a preliminary choice of law
analysis similar to that now used in admiralty. 8 ' If there is no conflict in the applicable law, Gilbert's convenience analysis would govern. If a conflict is present, a conflict of law analysis would aid the
the possibility of a change in law favorable to defendant ...

should not ...

enter into a trial court's analysis of the private interests. If the defendant is able
to overcome the presumption in favor of plaintiff by showing that trial in the
chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome, dismissal is appropriate-regardlessof the fact that defendant may also be motivated by a desire to obtain a
more favorable forum.

Id. (emphasis added).
78 While the factors outlined in Gilbert will enter into the plaintiff's decision, it would
be against the foreign plaintiffs interest to sue a U.S. corporation in the United States if
there were not a good chance that the federal court would apply more favorable law.
79 See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. Factors such as the presence of a
regulatory scheme that would govern the alleged tortious activity if carried on in the
United States, the interest of the United States in seeing its corporations carry out the
policies that it supports in the conduct of foreign affairs, and any similar state interests
would favor using the applicable state law. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
80 See generally E. SCOLES, supra note 26; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 6, 145 (1971).

81 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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court by adding the weight of government interest to one side or the
other.
Since Gilbert was decided in 1947, the rules governing conflicts
of laws have changed substantially. 8 2 For purposes of this comment,
the most important changes are the consideration of government interest in implementing policy through law, 8 3 and the recognition

that courts faced with muddled rules for resolving conflicts will seek
to advance what they perceive as the best interest of the substantive
field of law, and of justice in general.8 4 Thus, where the policy and
law of the forum government clearly conflict with those of another
interested government, judicial bias will naturally favor the more familiar law of the home state. 8 5
The extent to which a preliminary conflicts analysis will permit
the examination of conflicting governmental policies will be governed by the policy of the state in resolving conflicts of laws.8 6 Thus,
even if the state conflicts rules do not permit direct analysis of the
conflicting interests, the application of the rules will be consistent
with the policy of the forum. Whatever the rule, conflicts analysis is
more likely than forum non conveniens to address the concerns of
the parties in cases where conflicts exist. Rather than determining
the forum, and thereby the law most likely to be applied, according
to the convenience of the parties, the policies behind the rules of
substantive law would govern.
Under the present system, courts examine the choice of law
question on two levels in the trial process. First, the question
whether the court is familiar with the applicable law is one of the
public interest factors outlined in Gilbert and its progeny. 87 Second,
82 In 1947, the vested rights theory was generally applied to tort claims in all states.
Based on this theory, the right to assert a claim was created at the time and place of injury
and was, therefore, governed by the law of the place of injury. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-78 (1934); Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directionsfor
the Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2 (1977).
83 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). Despite considerable
disagreement among proponents of various theories, the policies that the forum government seeks to implement through its laws are important to any actual analysis. See Hana-

tiau, The American Conflicts Revolution and European Tort Choice of Law Thinking, 30 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 73, 79 (1982). For an example of the government interest approach in practice,
see Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
84 [In construing rules of choice of law the courts should seek to advance the
basic policy, or policies of the substantive field involved. In torts, there are
two basic policies, namely deterrence of tortious conduct and compensation
of the injured plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145
comment c (1971); W. PROSSER, TORTS 22-3 (4th ed. 1971). Of these, compensation for the plaintiff is probably the most important....
Reese, supra note 82, at 16-17 (1977).
85 See E. SCOLES, supra note 26, at 582 n.10.

86 Although a federal common law rule of conflicts may seem logical, the Supreme
Court has yet to change the rule requiring federal courts to apply state conflicts rules in
diversity. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (194 1). See E. SCOLES, supra note
26, at 110-13.

87 The question is not which law is better or more appropriate, but rather whether
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if the complaint survives the motion for dismissal on the ground of
forum non conveniens, the court must decide which substantive law
to apply according to the applicable state rules. Where there is a
conflict between potentially applicable law, conflicts rules must govern. A preliminary conflicts analysis would remove this duplication
of judicial effort.
While no court has denied that the Gilbert analysis should entail a
balancing of all of the private and public interest factors, courts do
not generally grant forum non conveniens dismissals when U.S. law
applies. 8 8 Similarly the need to apply foreign law, while clearly not
dispositive,8 9 has been given great weight in diversity cases. 90
The Gilbert test applies to cases within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts in the same way it applies to
diversity actions. 9 1 In admiralty, a preliminary choice of law analysis 92 precedes any forum non conveniens determination. "If the
court determines that U.S. law does apply, it ordinarily keeps the
case .... If the court determines that U.S. law does not apply, the
court balances the public and private convenience factors [set forth
'9 3
in Gilbert] . . .to determine whether it should dismiss the case."
Thus, in admiralty, unlike diversity, the trial court may consider the
governmental interest in seeing the forum law applied rather than
merely the inconvenience the court would suffer from the necessity
94
of applying foreign substantive law.
Several courts have recognized the need to consider governmental interests in the forum non conveniens context in much the
the court will be inconvenienced by the necessity of applying unfamiliar substantive law.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509.
88 The need to apply U.S. law weighs heavily in favor of keeping the case. This factor
is not, however, dispositive. In Piper the district court found that Pennsylvania law applied
to one defendant and the court of appeals found that Ohio law applied to the other. The
Supreme Court held that, regardless of which law applied, the other Gilbert factors mandated dismissal. Without passing on the conflicts question, the Court emphasized that the
necessity of applying foreign law weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. Piper, 454 U.S. at
235. See also Cheng, 708 F.2d at 1411. Research revealed no other case where a forum non
conveniens dismissal was granted despite the applicability of U.S. law.
89 "[T]he need to apply foreign law is not in itself a reason to apply the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir.
1972), and we must guard against an excessive reluctance to undertake the task of deciding foreign law, a chore federal courts must often perform." Manu Int'l, 641 F.2d at 67-68.
See also Friendsforall Children, 717 F.2d at 610; Shipping Corp. of India v. American Bureau
of Shipping, 603 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
90 Piper, 454 U.S. at 260.
91 Alcoa S.S., 654 F.2d at 153.
92 An eight step choice of law analysis accompanies all forum non conveniens determinations when a federal court exercises its maritime jurisdiction under the Jones Act (46
U.S.C. §§ 621-713 (1982)). Lauritzen v. Larsen, 354 U.S. 571 (1953).
93 Ali v. Offshore Co., 753 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1985); Fisher v. Agios Nicolaos
V, 628 F.2d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Valmas Bros. Shipping, S.A. v.
Fisher, 454 U.S. 816 (1981).
94 See Cuevas v. Reading & Bates Corp., 577 F. Supp. 462, 467 (S.D. Tex. 1983), af'd,
770 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1985).
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same way that state conflicts rules consider those interests. 95 A governmental interest in claims arising from a government-run operaof a
tion has been found sufficient to counterbalance the interest
96
foreign forum in adjudicating the claims of its nationals.
In Dowling v. Richardson-Merrel19 7 Judge Lively of the District of
Columbia Circuit added an additional factor to the list of public interest considerations under the Gilbert analysis. 98 A case involving an
industry which Congress or a foreign legislature regulates is indicative of a governmental interest in adjudicating the claim. 99
In addition to any governmental interest evidenced by regulatory schemes, the United States has an interest in adjudicating claims
involving U.S. corporations which have avoided state or federal regulations by locating their hazardous manufacturing facilities
overseas.
The "industrial flight" theory' 0 0 holds that the values systems
which underlie legal policies, the balancing of societal costs and benefits against individual profits or damages, and the sophistication of
the legal institutions that have evolved from these factors vary widely
from nation to nation. The gulf between legal doctrines is greatest
when the legal system of a highly-developed, wealthy and litigious
society is compared to that of an economically deprived country with
little experience in the problems associated with industrialization
and technology. 10 Differences in values and in the development of
legal doctrines and institutions normally create a significant difference in the cost of carrying on hazardous manufacturing activities
within the two systems. Thus, freedom from regulation and significantly lower risks of liability make less developed countries very attractive to multinational corporations faced with situs decisions.
Because multinational corporations are neither subjects of international law' 0 2 nor of the laws of a single nation,' 0 3 they are free to
95 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
96 Friendsfor all Children, 717 F.2d at 610.
97 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984); cf Haddad, 588 F. Supp. at 1161.
98 The idea was set forth in a 1981 student note. Note, supra note 66.
99 In Dowling a British regulatory agency had been substantially involved in licensing
the product which caused plaintiffs injuries. This was found to favor dismissal. 727 F.2d
at 616.
10o See generally H.J. LEONARD, ARE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS DRIVING U.S. INDUSTRY OVERSEAS 1-9 (1984).

101 See McGarity, Bhopal and the Export of Hazardous Technologies, 20 TEX. INT'L LJ. 333
(1985).
102 Despite attempts to impose internationally enforceable codes of conduct on multinationals, this rule is universally recognized. See OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 84 (July 19, 1976); United Nations Commission on Transnational
Corporations: Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 10 (1982), reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 192 (1983). The Guidelines are not legally
binding and the Draft code is not in effect.
103 Regardless of whether a corporation does business in more than one country or is
formally incorporated in separate countries, its activities will inevitably be subject to con-
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exploit differences among the laws of various nations.
Like most macro-economic theories, the industrial flight hypothesis is extremely difficult to prove by empirical evidence.' 0 4 The theory applies only to a very narrow group of heavily regulated
industries whose activities may subject them to particularly severe
tort liability.' 0 5 Factors such as labor costs, and the advantages of
servicing a market from a local facility are clearly considered in addition to the costs of liability and regulation when corporations decide
among available sites.i 0 6 Overly broad statements of the industrial
flight theory have proven untenable in light of empirical evidence. ' 0 7
A fairly high burden of proof, therefore, should fall on plaintiffs
seeking to invoke the governmental interest in punishing corporations that flee to pollution havens.
Forum non conveniens allows trial judges to dismiss claims involving torts by U.S. nationals in foreign countries. The current
trend towards increased application of the doctrineOs seems likely to
continue. The crowding of the federal dockets, and the complexity
of international claims that are partially responsible for the doctrine's increased popularity, are unlikely to abate in the near future.
Nonetheless, the courts must keep in mind the "central principle of
the Gilbert doctrine that unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed."1 09
If a governmental interest analysis of conflicts of laws was added
to the forum non conveniens determination, trial judges could examine the substantive issues that underlie the plaintiff's choice of
forum and the defendant's objection to it. Such an analysis would
not eliminate the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but would simply allow the trial judge to add consideration of the substantive law
flicting rules of law. One popular means of ensuring certainty in international contracts is
to specify the law of the contract. Such provisions are normally recognized in the United
States. M/S Brennan v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
104 For a discussion of this difficulty, see SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE
AND TRANSPORTATION, AND JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess., ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH/SAFETY REGULATIONS, PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: AN ASSESSMENT, (Comm. Print 1980) (prepared by G. Christainsen, F. Gallop,

and R. Haveman).

"Despite the assumptions of the Reagan and Carter administrations that industrial
flight from environmental regulations has been a significant trend, most of the evidence
cited to support claims of detrimental impacts continues to be anecdotal or inferential, not
based on any empirical research." H.J. LEONARD, supra note 100, at 9.
105 See H.J. LEONARD, supra note 100, at 17-21.
106 Id. at 41 (referring to the metal processing industry); Gladwin and Welles, Environmental Policy and MultinationalCorporate Strategy, STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 177, 198-99 (I. Walter ed. 1976).
107 See Gladwin and Welles, supra note 106, at 197-200; H.J. LEONARD, supra note 100,
at 9, 33-36.
10s Weinberg, supra note 39, at 313.
109 Manu Int'l, 641 F.2d at 65.
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to the factors that determine which forum, and thereby, which body
of law will govern a case.
-JOSHUA

N.

ROSE

